my citations of the thoughts of Lloyd-Jonesand Käsemann concerning this view in part one above). Of course,the Jews themselves are not thinking this way any more than did Paul thinkthis way before he trusted Christ. His description in 7:14-25 isnot a psychological depiction of the agony the Jew feels while trying toobey the law; if it were, the entire Jewish nation would have been rushingto faith in Christ for relief from their struggle! Paul's descriptionis more pointedly the Christian awareness of the inability of humanityapart from God to do what is good, which, in the final analysis, wouldbe to come to Christ on our own and by our own efforts. The purposeof the law is to lead people to Christ for justification (cf.
One issue about memory concerns the question of what distinguishesmemorial seemings from perceptual seemings or mere imagination. Somephilosophers have thought that having an image in one's mind isessential to memory, but that would appear to be mistaken. When oneremembers one's telephone number, one is unlikely to have an image ofone's number in one's mind. The distinctively epistemological questionsabout memory are these: First, what makes memorial seemings a source ofjustification? Is it a necessary truth that, if one has a memorialseeming that p, one has thereby prima facie justification forp? Or is memory a source of justification only if, ascoherentists might say, one has reason to think that one's memory isreliable? Or is memory a source of justification only if, asexternalists would say, it is in fact reliable? Second, how can werespond to skepticism about knowledge of the past? Memorial seemings ofthe past do not guarantee that the past is what we take it to be. Wethink that we are a bit older than just five minutes, but it islogically possible that the world sprang into existence just fiveminutes ago, complete with our dispositions to have memorial seemingsof a more distant past and items such as apparent fossils that suggesta past going back millions of years. Our seeming to remember that theworld is older than a mere five minutes does not entail, therefore,that it really is. Why, then, should we think that memory is a sourceof knowledge about the past?
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Why think that justification is external? To begin with,externalists about justification would point to the fact that animalsand small children have knowledge and thus have justified beliefs. Buttheir beliefs can't be justified in the way evidentialists conceive ofjustification. Therefore, we must conclude that the justification theirbeliefs enjoy is external: resulting not from the possession ofevidence but from origination in reliable processes. And second,externalists would say that what we want from justification is the kindof objective probability needed for knowledge, and only externalconditions on justification imply this probability. So justificationhas external conditions.
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There are of course alternative explanations of why you have (E).Perhaps you are hallucinating that the hat is blue. Perhaps an evildemon makes the hat look blue to you when in fact it is red. Perhapsyou are the sort of person to whom hats always look blue. Anexplanatory coherentist would say that, compared with these, the hat'sactual blueness is a superior explanation. That's why your arejustified in believing (H). Note that an explanatory coherentist canalso explain the lack of justification. Suppose you rememberthat you just took a hallucinatory drug that makes things look blue toyou. That would prevent you from being justified in believing (H). Theexplanatory coherentist can account for this by pointing out that, inthe case we are considering now, the truth of (H) would not be thebest explanation of why you are having experience (E). Rather,your having taken the hallucinatory drug would be an explanation atleast as good as the assumption as (H) is true. That's why, accordingto the explanatory coherentist, in this variation of our original caseyou wouldn't be justified in be believing (H).
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Let's agree that (H) is justified. According to coherentism, (H)receives its justification from other beliefs in the epistemic vicinityof (H). They constitute your evidence or your reasons for taking (H) tobe true. Which beliefs might make up this set ofjustification-conferring neighborhood beliefs?
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Let us move on to the second way in which the coherentist approachmight be carried out. Recall what a subject's justification forbelieving p is all about: possessing a link between the beliefthat p and p's truth. Suppose the subject knows thatthe origin of her belief that p is reliable. So she knows thatbeliefs coming from this source tend to be true. Such knowledge wouldgive her an excellent link between the belief and its truth. So wemight say that the neighborhood beliefs which confer justification on(H) are the following: