As the discipline of psychology emerged late in the 19thcentury, however, phenomena took on a somewhat different guise. InFranz Brentano’s Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint(1874), phenomena are what occur in the mind: mental phenomena are actsof consciousness (or their contents), and physical phenomena areobjects of external perception starting with colors and shapes. ForBrentano, physical phenomena exist “intentionally” in acts ofconsciousness. This view revives a Medieval notion Brentano called“intentional in-existence”, but the ontology remains undeveloped (whatis it to exist in the mind, and do physical objects exist only in themind?). More generally, we might say, phenomena are whatever we areconscious of: objects and events around us, other people, ourselves,even (in reflection) our own conscious experiences, as we experiencethese. In a certain technical sense, phenomena are things asthey are given to our consciousness, whether in perception orimagination or thought or volition. This conception of phenomena wouldsoon inform the new discipline of phenomenology.
More recently, analytic philosophers of mind have rediscoveredphenomenological issues of mental representation, intentionality,consciousness, sensory experience, intentional content, andcontext-of-thought. Some of these analytic philosophers of mind harkback to William James and Franz Brentano at the origins of modernpsychology, and some look to empirical research in today’s cognitiveneuroscience. Some researchers have begun to combine phenomenologicalissues with issues of neuroscience and behavioral studies andmathematical modeling. Such studies will extend the methods oftraditional phenomenology as the Zeitgeist moves on. Weaddress philosophy of mind below.
How do kinesthesis and vestibular sense differ? - Updated
We have surveyed the five senses described by Aristotle: vision, audition, olfaction, gustation, and touch. All five are directed outward to receive stimuli from the outside world. Two other important senses, kinesthesis and equilibrium, involve sensitivity to events: position and motion of the body. Kinesthesis and equilibrium are senses, from the root , which means . Kinesthetic receptors detect .
A large list of Adjectives that Start with K for your use
What makes an experience conscious is a certain awareness one has ofthe experience while living through or performing it. This form ofinner awareness has been a topic of considerable debate, centuriesafter the issue arose with Locke’s notion of self-consciousness on theheels of Descartes’ sense of consciousness (conscience,co-knowledge). Does this awareness-of-experience consist in a kind ofinner observation of the experience, as if one were doing two things atonce? (Brentano argued no.) Is it a higher-order perception of one’smind’s operation, or is it a higher-order thought about one’s mentalactivity? (Recent theorists have proposed both.) Or is it a differentform of inherent structure? (Sartre took this line, drawing on Brentanoand Husserl.) These issues are beyond the scope of this article, butnotice that these results of phenomenological analysis shape thecharacterization of the domain of study and the methodology appropriateto the domain. For awareness-of-experience is a defining trait ofconscious experience, the trait that gives experience a first-person,lived character. It is that lived character of experience that allows afirst-person perspective on the object of study, namely, experience,and that perspective is characteristic of the methodology ofphenomenology.
Resource: The Brain: Teaching Modules
These traditional methods have been ramified in recent decades,expanding the methods available to phenomenology. Thus: (4) In alogico-semantic model of phenomenology, we specify the truth conditionsfor a type of thinking (say, where I think that dogs chase cats) or thesatisfaction conditions for a type of intention (say, where I intend orwill to jump that hurdle). (5) In the experimental paradigm ofcognitive neuroscience, we design empirical experiments that tend toconfirm or refute aspects of experience (say, where a brain scan showselectrochemical activity in a specific region of the brain thought tosubserve a type of vision or emotion or motor control). This style of“neurophenomenology” assumes that conscious experience is grounded inneural activity in embodied action in appropriate surroundings—mixing pure phenomenology with biological and physical science in a waythat was not wholly congenial to traditional phenomenologists.