Multiregional origin of modern humans - Wikipedia

Despite scientific evidence to the contrary, however, there are those who continue to believe in evolution, and are therefore forced to accept and defend some form of spontaneous generation. The reason for this dogmatic adherence to spontaneous generation is eloquently pointed out by George Wald: "When it comes to the origin of life there are only two possibilities: Creation or spontaneous generation. There is no third way. Spontaneous generation was disproved one hundred years ago, but that leads us to only one other conclusion, that of supernatural creation. We cannot accept that on philosophical grounds; therefore, we choose to believe the impossible: That life arose spontaneously by chance!" According to Wald, it’s not about discovering the truth through the finding of fact, it’s not a matter of evidence, not a matter of science it’s a matter of philosophy! Like George Wald, many people do not like the alternative: that all life on earth was created by God. So, as Wald said, they are willing to "believe the impossible."

A New Thermodynamics Theory of the Origin of Life | …

Perhaps Bradley and Thaxton might agree. Though they do say that Oparin's hypothesis is 'conceptually bankrupt', they might be prepared to concede that this is an overstatement--the truth is rather, that there are large gaps in any evolutionary theory which runs along these lines. However, it is not at all clear that one should think that the presence of such gaps is a crippling defect in a scientific theory. Of course, if there is a competing theory which has no such gaps, then the competing theory will win. But, if there is no plausible competing theory, then it may be perfectly rational to continue to accept the theory in question, gaps and all. For all that has been said so far, it may be that the most reasonable thing to believe is that there is some way of filling this gap in the theory, but we don't yet know what it is. (Perhaps here it is worth recalling that there are large gaps in Big Bang cosmology, and, indeed, in many other historical sciences. If it cannot be reasonable to accept a global theory even though you are utterly unsure about some of the details, then it will not be reasonable to accept Big Bang cosmology--and so the crucial support for the cosmological argument will again disappear.)


common ancestor hypothesis - Scientific American

This appendix is an instance of a familiar feature of anti-evolution literature: a selection of quotes from well-known scientists and intellectuals expressing doubts about various aspects of contemporary evolutionary theory. Ankerberg and Weldon say: 'Virtually all aspects of evolutionary theory have recently encountered major critique by someone. Thus collectively considered, what now remains factually and scientifically established in evolutionary theory as a whole would appear to be marginal. Therefore we think it appropriate to consider new paradigms.' (271) However, it is at least worth noting: (i) that some of the anti-evolution quotes are from creationists or others who have never been well-disposed towards evolutionary theory; (ii) that the quotes are arranged without regard to chronology (and that there is no indication in the main text whether a quote belong to the 1950s or the 1990s, nor--in many cases--whether the person making the quote can plausibly be thought to be an expert on matters evolutionary); (iii) that the quotes are nearly all given without any clues about the contexts in which they are made, nor with any regard to different ways in which they might be interpretted; and (iv) that many of the quotes could only be thought to be damaging to the scientific standing of evolutionary theory if one makes absurd assumptions about the nature of science. (Let me illustrate with just one case. Ankerberg and Weldon start with this quote from E. White's Presidential Address to the Linnean Society, 1966: 'I have often thought how little I should like to prove organic evolution in a court of law.' This may sound damaging to evolutionary theory--and perhaps White worried that it was--but, in fact, there are very few scientific theories which can meet the standards which we demand in a court of law. In law, we require proof beyond all reasonable doubt; but, in science, we require only that our hypotheses be the most probable amongst those which we can devise (in light of all the evidence which is available). In some cases, we may have overwhelming evidence for a particular hypothesis--but there is no reason to think that this is likely to be the norm (particularly in historical sciences, where our data is bound to be somewhat patchy).)